Ongoing

National shutdown

Starting from the 12th day of widespread protest in the country, Internet traffic in Iran dropped to near zero around 20:00 local time (16:30 UTC) on 8 January 2026. Many local websites became unreachable as well, including the websites of the main local news agencies.

The shutdown was implemented through cutting almost all connectivity to Iran. It is not clear if local services are still running and available. As of 13:00 UTC 18 January, access to Google web search appears to have been restored, while traffic to other Google services, and what is monitored by Cloudflare and IODA appear to be at similar levels to the full blackout.

Local reports from 17 January indicated that access to Iranian messaging applications will be made available for authorized and verified channels on Eitaa, iGap, Rubika, and Soroush Plus.

Even though the service is not officially available in the country, IranWire reported that the Iranian government managed to interfere with Starlink service as well.

The significant Internet disruption characterized by widespread access limitations and periods of instability. The incident affected daily life across the country, disrupting work, education, healthcare coordination, and economic activity.

While authorities acknowledged the impacts and announced plans to restore access, connectivity was re‑enabled unevenly, with selective access provided to certain sectors and organizations. Independent network measurement organizations observed sharp declines in traffic and connectivity, followed by partial and asymmetric restoration rather than a full return to baseline conditions.

Alongside restoration efforts, officials announced mitigation measures and compensation plans, while parallel policy discussions continued around national Internet infrastructure and managed access frameworks.

  • Total Duration 24 days, 9 hours

Flag of Iran Iran

Population
91,567,738

Freedom House rates Internet freedom as Not Free

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Related documentation

In an interview with AlJazeera , Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister of Iran, admitted that shutting down access to the Internet came following what he called terrorist attacks from 8 January. However, in the same interview he mentioned that the terrorist were arrested and the country now is calm and in peace, but the Internet is still cut as of 13 January.

Internet disruptions in Iran during this period had wide‑ranging social and economic consequences. Local media reported significant impacts on daily life, including workers being unable to perform online tasks and students facing difficulties submitting coursework and participating in virtual examinations due to unstable or restricted connectivity (source).

Access limitations also affected public spaces and shared facilities. Reports from public libraries described prolonged periods without Internet access, highlighting challenges for students and residents who rely on such spaces as their primary means of connectivity (source). In parallel, some media outlets published guidance aimed at helping individuals and businesses manage essential activities during Internet shutdowns (source).

Several government bodies publicly acknowledged the effects of the disruptions on employment and economic activity. The Minister of Communications stated that efforts were underway to restore full Internet access as soon as possible and addressed concerns about losses incurred during the disruption period (source; source). Official estimates cited direct economic losses of approximately 500 billion tomans per day, while acknowledging that indirect losses were likely significantly higher. For comparison, the Internet Society’s NetLoss Calculator estimates the daily economic cost of an Internet shutdown in Iran at approximately USD 1.27 million.

Professional groups also raised concerns regarding Internet access. Medical professionals reportedly called for the rapid restoration of connectivity, citing impacts on healthcare coordination and service delivery (source). Additional reporting documented broader effects on employment and young workers (source).

During the disruption period, access to the global Internet was selectively restored for certain sectors. Officials announced that stable connectivity had been enabled for specific groups, including approximately 180 shipping and logistics companies in three cities (source). Authorities also described technical measures intended to support managed restoration, such as assigning fixed IP addresses to companies and allowing these to be added to access allow‑lists (source).

To mitigate economic impacts, the government announced financial support measures, including loans to knowledge‑based companies intended to cover up to three months of salaries as compensation for Internet shutdown‑related losses (source). In parallel, members of parliament called for compensation related to mobile Internet packages purchased during periods of service disruption (source).

Alongside discussions of restoration and compensation, some officials reiterated plans to expand national Internet infrastructure initiatives, including renewed emphasis on a domestic Internet framework and the development of a national search engine (source; source). Other officials reportedly raised questions regarding delays in implementing shutdown orders during the incident, indicating continued internal scrutiny of shutdown execution and governance (source).

Other supporting information

Data from Cloudflare Radar and IODA indicated traffic drops from 8 January at 16:30UTC, following a short drop in IPv6 earlier in the day, while data from Google Transparency Report indicate similar pattern, but with traffic returning to pre-shutdowns levels as of 18 January.

Partial restoration and selective access

Measurement platforms also reported that connectivity was partially and unevenly restored, rather than returning immediately to pre‑shutdown conditions. Observations indicated that restoration was sector‑specific, protocol‑specific, and geographically uneven, reflecting a managed approach to access rather than a full rollback of restrictions.

IODA signals showed that national‑level Internet activity recovered only gradually and remained below baseline levels for an extended period. This pattern suggested that while some networks or user groups regained connectivity, large segments of the population continued to experience reduced or no access (source).

Cloudflare’s traffic data similarly reflected partial recovery, with some Internet services and application categories showing improvement while overall request volumes from Iran remained suppressed compared to normal levels. This implied that access was not uniformly restored across platforms or users (source).

Kentik’s routing and traffic analysis indicated that international connectivity resumed along selected paths, while other routes remained constrained. These findings were consistent with reports of access being restored through controlled gateways or allow‑listed connections rather than broad, consumer‑level Internet access (source).

OONI measurements further documented continued anomalies in reachability and application access following the initial restoration announcements. In some cases, users were able to reach domestic services or specific international endpoints, while access to a wider range of global services remained impaired, pointing to ongoing filtering and traffic management (source).

Taken together, these findings suggest that the restoration phase involved selective reestablishment of connectivity, prioritizing specific sectors and use cases, rather than a full restoration of open Internet access. This aligns with official statements describing technical measures such as fixed IP assignments and allow‑listing as part of the recovery process.

A graph from Cloudflare Radar indicating a shutdown in Iran with a small drop between 15:00 and 15:30UTC on January 8, followed by starting around 16:00 and reaching near zero traffic around 16:45UTC. The graph also shows with partial and unstable traffic uptake on the 21, and then from the 25th January.
A graph from Cloudflare Radar indicating a shutdown in Iran with a small drop between 15:00 and 15:30UTC on January 8, followed by starting around 16:00 and reaching near zero traffic around 16:45UTC. The graph also shows with partial and unstable traffic uptake on the 21, and then from the 25th January.
A graph from IODA showing a drop in Active Probing measurement in Iran starting around 16:30UTC on January 8, while the BGP measurement remained as usual. The graph also shows with partial and unstable traffic uptake on the 21, and then from the 25th January.
A graph from IODA showing a drop in Active Probing measurement in Iran starting around 16:30UTC on January 8, while the BGP measurement remained as usual. The graph also shows with partial and unstable traffic uptake on the 21, and then from the 25th January.
A graph from Google Transparency report showing a drop in traffic to web search service from Iran starting around 16:30UTC on January 8 ending on 18 January
A graph from Google Transparency report showing a drop in traffic to web search service from Iran starting around 16:30UTC on January 8 ending on 18 January

IODA and other researchers and news agencies started reporting on the instability of the Internet connectivity in the country in the days prior to the shutdown.

Iranians have experienced significant instability and disruption in Internet access since nation-wide protests started Dec 29. IODA's view of the Internet interference is most visible in Active Probing. Our Active Probing signal has shown abnormal drops Jan […] [Original post on mastodon.social]

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— IODA @ Georgia Tech (@ioda.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy) January 8, 2026 at 11:19 PM