Service blocking
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, Telegram
National except Kurdish region
This shutdown had a significant impact on the Iraqi economy, with an article in the International Business Times placing the estimated impact at nearly a billion dollars. The article highlights the financial pain experienced by members of the emerging digital economy in Iraq, including startups, e-commerce sites, online delivery companies and couriers, and travel companies.
Local impact
This shutdown had a significant impact on the Iraqi economy, with an article in the International Business Times placing the estimated impact at nearly a billion dollars. The article highlights the financial pain experienced by members of the emerging digital economy in Iraq, including startups, e-commerce sites, online delivery companies and couriers, and travel companies.
Related documentation
Confirmed: #Iraq has blocked Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram and other platforms as of 12:30 UTC amid growing unrest as protesters approach Green Zone; network data show multiple providers affected; incident ongoing #Iraq_Protest #KeepItOn 📉 📰 https://t.co/7GF42YLDWU pic.twitter.com/mb6fjZTdbG — NetBlocks (@netblocks) October 2, 2019
Warning sensitive images: Iraqi protestors lie in blood dead & injured holding nothing but a flag as Iraqi forces shoot them dead. This is why Iraqi government have cut the Internet & destroyed news channels offices in Baghdad so the world can’t see their crimes.#save_iraq pic.twitter.com/mCFwwvXayk — Sarai (Sarah Idan) Miss Iraq (@RealSarahIdan) October 6, 2019
The Iraq government is restricting the internet while trying to silence protesters away from the eyes of the world. What are they hiding? Security forces in Iraq are using unnecessary lethal force against protesters, leaving more than 100 people killed and thousands injured. pic.twitter.com/4uGDRHbJSc — Amnesty International USA (@amnestyusa) October 12, 2019
Out of words again. This is one of the protests in Iraq. Despite an internet blackout, despite police killing protesters, the people continue to come out. pic.twitter.com/dw4BF9jjNj — Read Abolish Rent (@JPHilllllll) October 4, 2019
Total chaos in Iraq despite curfew. Internet access shut down. Many deaths. But no Western media coverage or condemnation or calls for UN intervention from stupid New York Times. They only attack peaceful India. pic.twitter.com/G5pG0OW5Sv — Indian-Americans (@HinduAmericans) October 4, 2019
Other supporting information
The most significant Internet disruption that occurred in October took place in Iraq, with connectivity impaired for over a week. Published accounts (AlMonitor, CPJ, AccessNow) reported violent protests over unemployment, government corruption, and a lack of basic services in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities on October 1-2, resulting in over a dozen deaths and hundreds of injuries. In response to the protests, the Iraqi government imposed a near total Internet shutdown on October 2, apparently beginning at approximately 1600 UTC, as shown in the figures below. The figures also illustrate that the shutdown did not completely remove Iraq from the Internet. This is reportedly due to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry of Transportation and Communications rejection of the call by the Iraqi federal government to cut off the Internet in the Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan region’s connection to international communications infrastructure is separate from the one in southern and central Iraq.



As the figures below show, the Internet disruption lasted for over a week, with measured metrics returning to “normal” levels on October 11. After a few brief restorations of connectivity on October 3 and 6, Internet availability settled into a “curfew” model, as described by NetBlocks, with access returning during the workday, and then being cut again in the evening.


Unsurprisingly, trends at a network level are nearly identical to the activity seen at a country-level. The figures below show measurements across three major Internet service providers in Iraq, with BGP and Active Probing patterns that appear very similar to the ones seen in the country-level graph above.



One published report explained that some Iraqis initially attempted to use VPN technology to circumvent connectivity restrictions, while those that could afford to made use of satellite-based Internet connectivity. Others queued content posts and videos within the social media and chat applications on their mobile devices, with the expectation that they would be sent when these devices were finally able to connect to the Internet.