Internet Shutdowns

As of 20th September 2022, OONI data shows that ISPs in Iran started blocking domain-based DNS over HTTPS (DoH) endpoints by means of DNS based tampering (returning bogons), in addition to implementing TLS level interference. Previously reachable DoH endpoints (such as cloudflare-dns.com) are now blocked.

Chart: OONI data on the blocking of popular DNS over HTTPS endpoints in Iran (source: OONI MAT).

As of 21st September 2022, OONI data shows that many ISPs in Iran started blocking access to WhatsApp endpoints, web.whatsapp.com, and www.instagram.com. We mostly observe TCP/IP blocking, with additional DNS and TLS blocking.

Chart: OONI data on the testing of WhatsApp on multiple networks in Iran between August 2022 to March 2023 (source: OONI MAT).

Chart: OONI data on the testing of www.instagram.com on multiple networks in Iran between July 2022 to March 2023 (source: OONI MAT).

As of 22nd September 2022, OONI data shows that multiple ISPs in Iran started blocking access to Google Play Store and Apple App Store domains.

Chart: OONI data [Oon the testing of domains related to Apple’s app store in Iran between August 2022 to September 2022 (source: OONI MAT).

Chart: OONI data on the testing of domains related to Google Play Store in Iran between August 2022 to September 2022 (source: OONI MAT).

As of 23rd September 2022, OONI data shows the blocking of Skype, while the blocking of Linkedin is automatically confirmed on at least 10 networks in Iran.

Chart: OONI data on the testing of www.skype.com on multiple networks in Iran between August 2022 to September 2022 (source: OONI MAT).

Chart: OONI data on the testing of www.linkedin.com on multiple networks in Iran between August 2022 to September 2022 (source: OONI MAT).

In addition to the above blocks (and many other long-term blocks), Iran experienced multiple severe outages affecting mobile networks, which are visible in the IODA, Cloudflare Radar and Kentik datasets.

OONI data suggests that Psiphon and Tor Snowflake worked in Iran, and can potentially be used for censorship circumvention. While OONI tests determine that it’s possible to bootstrap these tools from Iran and use them to fetch a small webpage, there is no data available regarding whether these tools are effective in providing circumvention for long periods of time.

Learn more through OONI’s research report.