- Internet fragmentation has been conceived of too narrowly–as have the tools that might combat it.
- States are using a combination of economic, legal, and covert powers targeting the Internet in other countries.
- These political shows of power point towards political solutions in international law and diplomacy.
Internet fragmentation threatens technical and social Internet interconnectivity. But Internet fragmentation has been conceived of too narrowly–as have the tools that might combat it. Often thought of as an inward-looking tool to bolster state sovereignty, Internet fragmentation is taking an outward turn, projecting state power.
What Does Internet Fragmentation Look Like?
Internet fragmentation is typically thought of as nations—primarily China, Iran, and Russia—asserting more control over their digital borders.
This conception of Internet fragmentation sees it as an isolationist and often authoritarian tool: think Internet shutdowns, country-based Internets, political control of Internet infrastructure, and more. These practices have often been described as bolstering digital sovereignty, a government’s control over what happens within and across its borders.
However, my new research demonstrates that the fragmenting forces of the Internet have become more diverse. Instead of primarily shoring up sovereignty within one’s borders, Internet fragmentation has become a way for states to project power outward. And it does so in a broad range of ways, from sanctions to sabotage to selective investment.
Export Controls and Tech-related Sanctions
Export controls and sanctions, an increasingly popular option, enable fragmentation. For example, the U.S. has implemented export controls on semiconductors that could significantly impact AI-powered Internet services within China. Previously, the U.S. implemented policies to keep Chinese Internet-related technology out of the U.S., but export controls turn that fragmenting impulse outward.
The same is also playing out in Iran, where Internet-based sanctions are blocking access to critical cloud services and Internet technologies that significantly improve speed, security, and performance.
Read: International Sanctions, Local Restrictions Widen Iran’s Digital Divide
Sabotage
Sabotage of the Internet’s physical infrastructure fragments the network. Attribution of sabotage, such as cutting of undersea fiber optic cables, is difficult, but experts consider the risk of Chinese- and Russian-backed cable-cutting incidents to be increasing.
And it is not just global powers who are employing this tool to project power: Houthi rebels in Yemen appeared to sever cables in the Red Sea during their ongoing campaign.
Read: Baltic Subsea Cables: A Story of Resilience, Not Fear
Selective Investment in Infrastructure
Perhaps counterintuitive, but the lack of investment in infrastructure also contributes to Internet fragmentation. The African continent, for example, did not receive the same degree of investment in fiber optic undersea cables as other regions. Essentially, decisions by resourced investors, both private and public, in non-African countries negatively affected the continent’s interconnectedness—a kind of fragmentation by absence.
As new modes of connection emerge, including LEO satellites, decisions about where to make this infrastructure available and under what political conditions will continue to shape this kind of inverse fragmentation.
Contesting the Rules That Govern the Internet
Fragmentation is often thought of as states asserting control over the technical infrastructure of the Internet. But states are also asserting control over the legal infrastructure of the Internet.
For example, the last two decades have seen significant fragmentation of the international rules governing cybercrime. And although the UN recently passed the UN Convention on Cybercrime, intended to be an international mechanism, this fragmentation echoes both in its construction and will continue to echo in the states that endorse it.
Infrastructural fragmentation and legal fragmentation interact in surprising ways. My research demonstrates a correlation between, for example, African countries with the least robust undersea cable infrastructure and support for the African Union’s regional cybersecurity (Malabo) convention (Table 1).
Combating Fragmentation Starts With Recognizing Its Variations
Understanding that states can benefit from using Internet fragmentation as a form of power projection affects calculations on combating splintering. These political benefits point towards political solutions in international law and diplomacy, and the need to encourage investment.
Internet fragmentation is not just authoritarianism, domestic control, or the network itself: power in all of its forms must be taken into account.
Mailyn Fidler is an Assistant Professor (Visiting) at Harvard Law School.
The views expressed by the authors of this blog are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Internet Society.